Telegraph

Deterrence works (Filed: 02/12/2001)

THE deaths of perhaps as many as 400 Taliban fighters after the fall of the Taliban stronghold of Kunduz have already led to calls for an inquiry into the manner in which they died.

Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, has expressed her "particular concern" about the deaths, and Amnesty International has said there must be an investigation into the "proportionality" of the Northern Alliance response.

This newspaper does not often agree with Peter Hain, the Foreign Office minister, but his resolute rejection of those demands with a terse "We do not need an inquiry" is absolutely right.

The facts are already known: 400 fanatical Taliban, most of them Arabs, Pakistanis and Chechen - and so hated by native Afghanis almost as much as the Russians who invaded two decades earlier - had been taken prisoner and herded into the 19th century fortress of Qaili Janghi.

They were inadequately guarded by as few as 50 soldiers from the Northern Alliance, who themselves were being advised by fewer than half a dozen officers from British and American special forces. The Taliban overwhelmed their guards, seized their weapons, and transformed themselves from prisoners of war into combatants.

Since Qaili Janghi was also being used as an arsenal by the Northern Allance general Abdel Dostum, once the Taliban gained control of their prison, they were extremely well-armed. Determined to fight to the death, the Taliban killed whoever they could, including one man from the CIA.

They were eventually overwhelmed by a combination of air-strikes by American jets and a frontal assault by fresh troops from the Northern Alliance. A number of Taliban were subsequently found shot, each with his hands bound behind his back.

A witness from the Northern Alliance claimed the men had a suicide pact: one Taliban fighter with free hands shot his bound comrades before turning the gun on himself. Even if that particular account is found implausible, there is no suggestion that any British or American soldier encouraged, or had any part to play, in those killings.

Indeed, British and American Special Forces wish to take Taliban fighters alive: a surving Taliban may be a source of vital information, but a dead one is of no use to anyone.

The British and Americans have intervened to try to stop the killing of prisoners: last week, for example, eight US "observers" pleaded with an anti-Taliban general not to execute 150 Taliban prisoners in his power. They failed.

The prospect of those men being investigated by Gucci-clad human rights lawyers from Islington is as risible as it is ludicrous. That prospect seems to have diminished, at least for the time being.

There is, however, a potent body of Western opinion which persists in believing that the only acceptable way to respond to the outrages of September 11 is to do nothing - except, perhaps, talk. If America were to stop fighting - so the argument goes - and to address the "grievances" of the Muslim world, then the terrorism would end.

The idea that the men who would be the next generation of al-Qaeda's terrorists could be persuaded to abandon that project by well-meaning aid-workers bearing gifts is a dangerous if seductive error. It is also comprehensively refuted by the facts. The fanaticism which leads men to contemplate joining al-Qaeda has never been quelled by argument.

The past decade demonstrates the extent to which failing to confront terrorism with force has one effect, and one effect only: it encourages the terrorists to commit bolder, bloodier, and more brutal outrages.

Bin Laden's lieutanants have stated that the moment the Americans withdrew from Somalia, after a mere handful of casualties, it was clear to them that the country was utterly decadent, unable and unwilling to defend itself. America could therefore be attacked with impunity.

Attacked it was - for it was precisely that line of thought which led bin Laden to carry out the September 11 attacks. The success of that outrage gave him an almost mystical power and status within the Muslim world. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, there were large demonstrations in his support in many Muslim countries.

The disappearance of those demonstrations over the last few weeks shows that the war against him in Afghanistan has not enhanced bin Laden's mystique - as many confidently claimed it would. On the contrary, it has diminished it.

As he cowers in his cave, bin Laden has become a figure of contempt rather than a symbol of awesome and terrifying power. For that change, the prompt and concerted action by the West is entirely responsible.

The defeat of terrorism depends on the West having the courage and commitment to follow to its conclusion the war on the people who perpetrate terrorism, and on the states who support and shield them. Deterrence works. Nothing else does.

Every retreat, every inquiry, every vacillation which signals a weakening of our determination to respond effectively to the terrorist threat, increases the likelihood that al-Qaeda will re-group and strike again. That is the main lesson from the campaign in Afghanistan.

-- Anonymous, December 02, 2001