Economics is a science of sorts, and as such, it is an interesting way of looking at things that provides some important insights. But the fact is that economists have taken little interest in Y2K. I can name two: Edward Yardeni of Deutsche Bank and Don Mitchell of World Bank. It appears that all other economists (when commenting on Y2K) either parrot one or both (even if only slightly) or they discount Y2K completely. In other words, they haven't done the foot work. And I will contend that neither Yardeni nor Mitchell have time in their days or adequate resources to dig into Y2K. Yardeni was not joking when he said that he was only talking/thinking about the tip of the iceberg.

So, yes, I'm really not interested in what economists (in general) have said about Y2K, because they don't really know what they are talking about. And it's not really their fault. It's mostly a research problem. And I think I am qualified to discuss research problems: I was formerly a Director of Research for the New Coalition for Economic and Social Change, a Research Associate with the David Institute, Research Assitant for Templeton Prize winner Michael Novak (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), etcetera. Beyond my vitae, I have had recent opportunity to discuss, evaluate, and access research methods and databases used in developing economic statements.

The most apparent and signficant problem in developing forward looking statements in regard to Y2K is the same general problem that "we" have encountered: companies, organizations, and associations are reluctant to fully disclose their own vulnerabilities, remediation efforts, and contingency plans-- even when offered protection of confidentiality. Few want to talk. Fewer are willing to talk. And fewer are willing to undertake the kind of effort to enable those willing to talk to talk. And the latter is a significant problem: even if you get interesting information, you can't share that information with others due to the confidentiality agreements. So everyone has to do their own leg work.

Very few chief and senior economists have the staff, resources, and motivation to do such leg work. For the most part, they interpret numbers they get from the various databases to which they are subscribed. A think thank like the Rand Corporation is better equipped to gather information, but there doesn't seem to be anything out there that economists can readily use when developing a year 2000 outlook. Nor is it really worth the while of economists to think too hard about Y2K. It's not going to help your career-- if you get your predictions wrong. It is not going to get you air time or significant coverage-- even if you have some very interesting discoveries to share with us.

Sincerely,
Stan Faryna

See my rational explanation for making Y2K preparations?

http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001RUO

Got 14 days of preps? If not, get started now. Click here.

Click here and check out the TB2000 preparation forum.

-- Stan Faryna (faryna@groupmail.com), November 10, 1999

Answers

From an earlier thread....

"Shall we judge physicists by their inability to fully explain some rather "simple" phenomena?

Or shall we put engineers to the forecasting test? As an engineer, tell me exactly when my hard drive will fail. Or when a given bridge will fall. Or when my car's engine will die? Why not?

A very small part of economics is forecasting. Do you want engineers judged by their inability to predict (with accuracy) the exact moment of failure of a mechanical device? Of course not. It is unfair to criticize engineers (or economists) for their inability to soothsay the future.

And how about giving economists credit for their contributions? The modern engineering firm depends as much on ideas generated by economists as engineers.

To your original argument, economists are much more accurate in short- term forecasts. The mathematical tools of Newtonian calculus, however, are ill-suited for complex systems. The sheer number of variables in the global economy makes precise long-term forecasting nearly impossible.

This said, let's not throw out the baby with bathwater. Economists make valuable contributions to our understandng of the economic world, and deserve better than a "brush off" over forecasting records."

-- Ken Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), November 10, 1999.

Red,

Your heated reply to Robert Cook (above) is not without merit. But I think that as a reply to my illustration of the problematics of economic forecasts about Y2K, your reply to Mr. Cook is an inadequate reply to me. I realize that you have only so much time to make replies (we all are pretty much limited-- at least those of us who work for a living), but do take some time to think over these problematics I have emphasized and get back to me.

Sincerely, Stan Faryna

-- Stan Faryna (faryna@groupmail.com), November 10, 1999.

WASHINGTON DC GOVERNMENT ECONOMIST HUNTING REGULATIONS AND BAG LIMITS

GENERAL

1. Any person with a valid Washington DC hunting license or a Federal Income Tax Return may harvest government economists.

2. Taking of economists with traps or deadfalls is permitted. The use of currency as bait is prohibited.

3. Killing of economists with a vehicle is prohibited. If one is accidentally struck, remove the dead economist to side of the road and proceed to the nearest car wash.

4. It is unlawful to chase, herd, or harvest economists from limousines, Mercedes Benz's, the Metro, or Porsches.

5. It shall be unlawful to shout "research contract" or "I need a policy consultant" for the purpose of trapping economists.

6. It shall be unlawful to hunt economists within 100 feet of government buildings.

7. It shall be unlawful to use decision memos, draft legislation, conference reports, or RFP's to attract economists.

8. It shall be unlawful to hunt economists within 200 feet of Senate or House hearing rooms, libraries, whorehouses, massage parlors, special interest group offices, bars, or strip joints.

9. If an economist is elected to government office, it shall be a felony to hunt, trap, or possess it. It will also be a shame.

10. Stuffed or mounted economists must have a DC Health Department inspection certificate for rabies and vermin.

11. It shall be illegal for a hunter to disguise as a reporter, drug dealer, pimp, female congressional aid, sheep, legislator, policy maker, bookie, lobbyist, or tax accountant for the purpose of hunting economists.

BAG LIMITS

1. Econometrician - 2

2. Two-faced Policy Analyst - 1

3. Macro Policy Wonk - 4

4. Big-mouthed Populist - 2

5. Relevant Economist - EXTINCT

6. Cut-throat Administration Seeker - 2

7. Back-stabbing Senior Author - 2

8. Brown-nosed Deputy Kisser - 2

9. Silver-tongued Congressional Consultant - $100 BOUNTY

10. Wise-assed Civil Libertarian - 7

11. Staff economist - no limit

-- I gotta (million@of.em), November 10, 1999.

Concur. Thanks Stan.

-- a (a@a.a), November 10, 1999.

ROTFLMAO

-- a (a@a.a), November 10, 1999.

One day a woman went for a walk in her neighborhood and came across a boy with some puppies. "Would you like a puppy? They aren't ready for new homes quite yet, but they will be in a few weeks!"

"Oh, they're adorable," the lady said. "What kind of dogs are they?" "These are economists." "OK. I'll tell my husband."

So she went home and told her husband. He was very interested to see the puppies. About a week later he came across the lad; the puppies were very active.

"Hey, Mister. Want a puppy?" "I think my wife spoke with you last week. What kind of dogs are these?" "Oh. These are decision analysts." "I thought you said last week that they were economists." "Yeah, but they've opened their eyes since then."

-- a (a@a.a), November 10, 1999.

Stan,

Your thesis: economists do not have the tools or resources to understand the Y2K problem.

My response:

1. Why do you think the assortment of forum regulars have better tools than economists? Please provide any evidence you might have.

2. Economist Ed Yardeni has dedicated considerable time (and resources) to the Y2K problem. Why does he conclude the most likely outcome is an economic recession less severe thant the '73-74 crisis. Please note that Mr. Yardeni gathered experts from outside his field of expertise.

3. Do you think economists (or senior executives) would remain quiet about Y2K if they felt their personal safety was at risk? What is the greater incentive, Stan? Self preservation or corporate loyalty?

4. Do you think massive Y2K problems could be kept secret from the public at large for an extended period of time?

5. Most economists rely on the same reports that you and I read. Economists believe the FDIC... do you? If not, what is your evidence that the FDIC is lying. Not just motive, Stan, but proof of a massive cover-up. Lacking this proof, do you see how economists might actually trust the FDIC reports as basically sound?

-- Ken Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), November 10, 1999.

A fable: Sometime in the now legendary 20th Century a group of people gathered to discuss their dissatisfaction with their career choices...they lamented that no one took their prognostications about money seriously. During that auspicious gathering they hit upon a solution to their credibility problem; they'd call themselves "scientists", and the people would then hang on their every word, 'cos, after all is said and done, scientists are imbued with magic; the people love magic, and bread and circuses (Panem et circenses). They put forth a proclamation: "Hereafter, we economists will be known to all as Scientists,...let all genuflect, pay obeisance, and be amazed!"

Sadly the legend does not say if the newly proclaimed Scientist-Economists were any happier after the gathering, but we know they were a lot wealthier.

-- Donna (moment@pacbell.net), November 10, 1999.

a, LOL! If you search on "economist jokes," there are scores on the web. Here's one:

Definitions

Q. If two economists were out walking, how would you recognize the econometrician?

A. He's the one walking randomly.

Q. What do economists and computers have in common?

A. You have to punch information into them.

Q. How did the French Revolution affect world economic growth?

A. Too early to say.

Q. What does an economist do?

A. Not a lot in the short-run, which means nothing in the long-run.

Q. Why were economists created?

A. To make weather forecasters look good.

Q. Why was astrology invented?

A. So that Economics could be an accurate science.

Q. Why don't sharks attack economists?

A. Professional courtesy.

Q. What do you get when you cross the Godfather with an economist?

A. An offer that you can't understand.

Q. What is the difference between Economics and DoubleDutch?

A. DoubleDutch is incomprehensible, Economics just doesn't make sense.

-- Now (I@got.more), November 10, 1999.

.... and a reply from that earlier thread.

Sir Ken,

Thank you for the comments: yes, we (engineering and reliability) can make very accurate, very specific predictions about failure rates of mechanical, structural, or even electronic devices; such as the hard drive you mentioned.

From your (earlier) reply: < A very small part of economics is forecasting. Do you want engineers judged by their inability to predict (with accuracy) the exact moment of failure of a mechanical device? Of course not. It is unfair to criticize engineers (or economists) for their inability to soothsay the future.>>

Yep - engineers regularly do forecasting (on mechanical things usually) - which are admittedly much easier than people-decisions.

BUT - we (engineers) ARE held liable for our decisions. Economists are siply excused by their political-paid-for-your-opininion and press conference sponsors. they are not criticized, held accountable, or made to pay for their errors. (If they were, Marx would be laughed at today in the colleges and universities .... hint: he is NOT studied as a failure and a hypocrite.....)

No economist has ever been sued, jailed, or removed from their profession for failing to predict the future accurately; and, to date, I have seen no reason to trust their predictions in this matter. In particular, THERE IS NO PAST DATA.

Any economist - who cannot predict the future of known events with only one thing changing (tax returns) - is foolish (or a paid political hack) to predict the future of something with literally billions of unknowns: each decision made by every person involved, combined with each "decision" made by the millions of automated processes involved.

---

Yes - engineering is regularly put through (always put through) a reliability test: will this bridge stay up? Will this car door operate for 12 months, 24 months, or twenty years? If it should last for 30 months, how many will fail after 24 mnths, how much willit cost to replace the door, and how much should we charge for the 24 month warranty? How much will the labor rates and standard man-hour jobs need to be to still make money on building (a) a stronger door, (b) the same door (c) a weaker door that can be replaced easier? Ever ask a economist that level of question?

Will this satellite power supply operate through 30,000 cycles of heating and cooling in a vacuum? Will it operate after the severe shock and vibration of the rocket launch? Will this building stay up after a magitude 6 earthquake? A magnitude 8 earthquake?

How long will this tire last? How long will the same tire last if used at racing speeds - and how can we make it last longer? Wha tis the tread life on a 747 tire?

Simple to predict the future of devices - using any of several reliablility models (I like the Weibull for many predictions, though others are more appropriate depending on the failure mode and type of data. Exponential, linear, etc are all appripriate at different times.

The predictions, like any statistical function, will become more accurate as more data is accumulated. The actual predictions, like any statistical function, are correct in general for a population, not to any single failure of any single piece. Accurate in general though: like life insurance table. They (the insurance industry) makes its money using general predictions, but cannot tell you when you will die.

Your hard drive, for example, can be predicted (as a electronic device, to have two dominate failure modes: immediate loss (electronics failure) during the burn-in phase, then - if that passes satisfactorily, a mechanical lifetime for through the routine lifetime of the hardware. (Assuming no sudden disruptions like a severe shock or your house/office buring down.)

---

Y2K? Economists have no data, no idea of what's actually going to happen. They CANNOT predict the future impact because they (and nobody else) have ANY data.

ALL they have are guesses - tainted completely by their prejudices, their environment - I'd bet those issuing these predictions have not been in any industrial environment, any fabrication, any computer shop, and test lab, nor in any distribution control center. They - by being surrounded by equally unqualified individuals - do college prof's live in the real world? - have no background in this environment of failure mode analysis, critical path scheduling and failure effects, software testing and corrections, software revision control, engineering control systems, engineering data collection and analysis, plant/assembly line control, product distribution, product shipping, automated product handling, etc.

I have. My conclusion is equally simple: They're wrong.

--

Now, I'll grant you I may be incorrect. If so, I have lost nothing, but have protected my family. These economists aren't even smart enough to add a "maybe" to their predictions.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), November 10, 1999.

OK Ken, I'll try to help you understand again.

1. Why do you think the assortment of forum regulars have better tools than economists? Please provide any evidence you might have.

I don't think that this claim was made, but if you could explain to me how economists could not even predict the 73-74 recession, I'd appreciate it. In fact, we still don't know why 73-74 was such a problem macroeconomically. Oh, I forgot, this is not your area of expertise. You're a microeconomist.

2. Economist Ed Yardeni has dedicated considerable time (and resources) to the Y2K problem. Why does he conclude the most likely outcome is an economic recession less severe than the '73-74 crisis. Please note that Mr. Yardeni gathered experts from outside his field of expertise.

Yardeni has been looking at financial and other economic indicators which might tell him in advance if peoples' EXPECTATIONS were that there would be problems. I expected more uncertainty to manifest itself long before now, but I think the REAL problem which Yardeni and others lament is the lack of INFORMATION. Fisher, one of the greatest financial economists of the 20th century (who gave the profession the concept of real interest rates), was blind to the crash of 1929.

3. Do you think economists (or senior executives) would remain quiet about Y2K if they felt their personal safety was at risk? What is the greater incentive, Stan? Self preservation or corporate loyalty?

I think most haven't done the research. Yardeni is no doomer, but he still expects a slowdown. Almost none of the other economists even has it on the radar screen.

4. Do you think massive Y2K problems could be kept secret from the public at large for an extended period of time?

If the President of the United States can get away with selling nuclear secrets to the People's Liberation Army of China in exchange for campaign contributions, then anything is possible.

5. Most economists rely on the same reports that you and I read. Economists believe the FDIC... do you? If not, what is your evidence that the FDIC is lying. Not just motive, Stan, but proof of a massive cover-up. Lacking this proof, do you see how economists might actually trust the FDIC reports as basically sound?

The FDIC can literally not afford to have widespread bank runs across the country. What would you have them do, identify banks that they expect not to make it?

Thanks Stan, for all of your help to newbies!

-- nothere nothere (notherethere@hotmail.com), November 10, 1999.

Mr. Cook,

As you know, a rate of failure is far different than predicting a specific failure. As for economist failures... various firms employ economists to provide data and analysis. For the record, economists have been fired for failing to produce acceptable results... just like engineers.

This is not to say economists have not made accurate predictions. One of the more famous... Keynes' prediction of the end result of the Treaty of Versailles. On the whole, however, I am not aware of any profession that can predict the future with accuracy. Complex systems, like the weather, defy our limited mathematical tools.

Using your logic, we should basically ignore what economists say about Y2K... although I might contend Ed Yardeni has made a cross- disciplinary study of the issue. Continuing with your logic, we should also ignore the engineers. From my perspective, engineers cannot predict the future... not of a complex system like our economy.

We can model some systems rather well. As an engineer, you may have used the results of a transportation model. (I used to manage one.) These results can be quite accurate... and the model is calibrated down to a rather precise level. For example, with a solid model, I can tell you how traffic patterns will change if you widen a bridge, or change a speed limit. This is applied microeonomics.

Transportation modeling works because people behave in relatively predictable patterns... but a roadway network is much more tangible than an entire economy.

Again, Mr. Cook, you return to Pascal's Wager. What I would argue is that every action has a "cost." Your decision to prepare has a "cost," if only in time. You obviously feel the risk justifies the expense. The logic of Pascal's Wager, however, breaks down when you realize there is no action without some cost.

Next post:

1. Did you predict the 73-74 recession? (laughter) We do have a better understanding of the dynamics of the recession... although imperfect.

2. Yardeni has talked to experts across the board. If you read his "100-day" conferences, you'll see the breadth of participation. Is this "delphi" approach perfect? No, but it ain't half bad. And we NEVER have enough data. (laughter)

3. I think most economists will be surprised... but not all.

4. Bad analogy. Transactions between two parties are far different than the overall state of IT systems worldwide. A huge number of people have a piece of the Y2K puzzle, i.e. is my system ready for rollover. The problem... no one has all the pieces.

5. The FDIC has already come down on some banks for inadequate progress. It is easy enough to stop a bank run. You close the bank. It is much harder to make the run. (laughter) The FDIC doesn't have a "quick fix" for an unremediated bank. If you have to sacrifice a few banks before rollover, so be it. The real interest of the FDIC is having the system function.

-- Ken Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), November 10, 1999.

Stan:

You raise important issues here, but your conclusion only begs these same issues. These issues may not be soluable.

Y2k does not present us with the luxury of hard numbers and repeatable measurements. All too much of it is subjective. Even when we have accurate information (not always the case), that information is invariably imbued with a subtle (or not so subtle) emphasis. Much like most denizens of this forum present and discuss real threats, without explicitly recognizing that their source material has been systematically skimmed from the top of all the material available, and consists solely of the worst of the worst. The universe of forum discourse has been constrained a very small and deliberately biased subset of the whole.

Assume that a CEO describes a falsely optimistic picture of his company's remediation status. This deception is usually more than skin deep -- often, the CEO *really wants* things to be OK, so he (perhaps subconsciously) focuses much more intensely on the progress reports than on the problem reports. He has seen the problem reports, he's read them, he may even understand them, but he gives them much less weight in his own mind, because the alternative is uncomfortable. So his false description is sincere and, in his own mind, fully informed.

Conversely, we read of many problems whose ultimate source is those in the business of correcting those problems. This too is more than simple mendacity; the desire to encourage further business. These people are problem solvers -- they aren't called in when there are no problems. Their very exposure is one-sided, lending problems an undue emphasis, just as an off duty patrolman is much more alert to danger than an ordinary pedestrian. The actual danger is no greater, but the perception is.

As you have (in my opinion excellently) written, good information is very difficult if not impossible to collect. Even the individual programmer often cannot predict what a given bug would do if left uncorrected. Even if this were possible, nobody can look through all the world's code, integrating the (ever changing) status of every project. And even if *that* were possible, this speed-reader could not predict the highly contingent ramifications of these bugs which are inherent in the nature of the future.

With all of this in mind, there are clearly severe limitations to even the most conscientious "leg work". Our information is fractal in the sense that it becomes no clearer or less ambiguous the deeper you dig. Firmer conclusions cannot be drawn at one level of detail more than at another level. It may be informative to notice that those economists who have spent the most time explicitly studying y2k are among the most concerned, provided we recognize that their concerns do not describe more than a possible mild recession.

It should be noted that there is absolutely no clear correlation between one's knowledge and awareness of y2k, and one's expectations of what y2k will cause. Both those who expect minor and manageable problems, and those who expect significant breakdowns, range from casual dillitants to intense researchers. Expectations are quite evidently based far more on one's basic outlook on life than on one's information.

This forum tends to be inhabited by those whose views tend toward the pessimistic and often enough the distrustful. And they are not, on average, either more or less knowledgeable than the inhabitants of fora set up to minimize rather than maximize the scope of the problem. So I don't think that "leg work" lies at the heart of the matter. In the case of y2k, leg work serves almost entirely to *justify* one's opinion, rather than create it.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), November 10, 1999.

Flint,

I enjoyed your reply. And Red is getting testy. Sheesh. (laughing loudly) What's with this good cop, bad cop play?

Sincerely, Stan Faryna

P.S. I hope to reply to both of your responses both later this evening.

-- Stan Faryna (faryna@groupmail.com), November 10, 1999.

To me, and maybe I'm just biased because I'm a scientist, Robert's post stands out as a pillar of reason. Economists aren't even social fiction, there're a joke.

-- a (a@a.a), November 10, 1999.

Red,

Some economists may have the kind of thinking cap that might allow them to understand Y2K problems and make thoughtful forecasts on how Y2K will play out in economic terms. Whether or not they have the numbers to crunch or interest enough to get the numbers and crunch them are questions that I entertain in my brief sortie at the foot step of this thread. Now, that we have cleared up this confusion, I'll attempt to answer your questions.

You ask:

"Why do you think the assortment of forum regulars have better tools than economists? Please provide any evidence you might have."

My reply:

I don't imagine that the assortment of intelligent, compassionate, and thoughtful forum regulars have greater talent, tools, and resources than some economists. I didn't write or suggest any such thing. On the other hand, I personally know economists who don't belong sitting in the chairs they sit. I could tell you about a guy in the Department of Transportation who submitted a resume suggesting he had appropriate degrees and experience when in fact he had none of these. Anyway, I'm no snitch, baby. So you better get your dirt, elsewhere. Of course, I have confidences to keep too. But even the fuzzy economic analysis that goes on here... grapples with ideas, facts, and possibilities that are unconsidered elsewhere.

You ask:

"Economist Ed Yardeni has dedicated considerable time (and resources) to the Y2K problem. Why does he conclude the most likely outcome is an economic recession less severe thant the '73-74 crisis. Please note that Mr. Yardeni gathered experts from outside his field of expertise."

My reply:

I have no idea what kind of time and resources Ed has tasked to the study of Y2K. Do you, Red? Do you work in his office? Sure, Ed is all over Y2K like no other economist. That much is apparent. However, I'd like to ask you to get a copy of the job description for Deutche Bank's chief economist. I'll bet it doesn't say anything about Y2K. On the other hand, whatever forecasts Ed has made about Y2K are poo pooed at and laughed about by economists around the world. And, yes, Ed has hosted some nice round table discussions, but he seems to want a little company out there on the limb. It shows. Now, I don't blame him for wanting company out there. But like I said, it's not a career maker.

Please *note* that we helped set up one of Ed Yardeni's interviews.

You ask:

"Do you think economists (or senior executives) would remain quiet about Y2K if they felt their personal safety was at risk? What is the greater incentive, Stan? Self preservation or corporate loyalty?"

My reply:

Hey, you must really be from Montana. (laughing) There are things that I think, there are things that I imagine, and there are things that I know. I distinguish the differences among these with clarity. That doesn't mean I'm going to air personal and private conversations that I have had with present and former executives, economists, military officers, etcetera in public. How about you? Do you got the dope? Beyond the dope on what people may or may not be doing in their personal preparations for Y2K, we might consider the distinction between risk and danger. Briefly, risk is the possibility of danger. Danger is just that: fight or flight, baby. Why am I explaining this to you?

For some that are not in the *know*, but who get it just the same... making personal preparations for Y2K risks is one thing, while raising the alarm is another thing entirely. At least, it can seem that way. For some in the *know*, information and relationships may be essential to self-preservation. Raising alarms will only shut down access to information and relationships that may keep you in good standing in good times and bad. So what's it going to be, Red? Are you a team player? I get the feeling that you are a team player, but then you want to examine my conscience... or the conscience of some executive. Hey, you're a team player or you aren't. If you aren't, no dope for you.

You ask:

"Do you think massive Y2K problems could be kept secret from the public at large for an extended period of time?"

My reply:

The shrewd anticipation of massive Y2K problems has been kept secret from the public at large for an extended period of time. Will massive problems occur? I don't know. Do you? If massive Y2K problems occur, can the true nature of the problems be concealed from the public at large for an extended period of time? I imagine that any decision to keep secrets will be weighed with an assessment of potential damages (political or otherwise) that might result from such public knowledge. Whether or not such deceptions would be fully or adequately successful (if so decided) remains to be considered further. Can one sucessfully conceal the nature of a power failure that occurs at midnight on New Year's Eve? Seems unlikely.

You ask:

"Most economists rely on the same reports that you and I read. Economists believe the FDIC... do you? If not, what is your evidence that the FDIC is lying. Not just motive, Stan, but proof of a massive cover-up. Lacking this proof, do you see how economists might actually trust the FDIC reports as basically sound?"

My reply:

Which economists have studied the same Y2K reports that you and I have so diligently studied? I know of economists, people in politics, Fortune 500 people, $5,000+ per day business and industry consultants, and many others who have not read any of these reports. Red, you have this uncanny and misplaced confidence that everybody is doing the right thing, doing it the way things should be done, and doing it to the best of their god damn ability. This ain't Montana, Red. And I doubt that Montana is all that. Yes, there's no massive cover-up like some imagine. Mostly, there is massive incompetency. So then, is there incompetency at the FDIC? Why should I suspend my doubt about the FDIC? (laughing)

Sincerely, Stan Faryna

-- Stan Faryna (faryna@groupmail.com), November 11, 1999.

Flint,

You write that these issues may not be soluable. Certainly, not in the days remaining, Flint. So, yes, I agree. And I do doubt they may be soluable beyond Y2K. And I agree with much of what follows. Let me improve, however, on your statement: Expectations are quite evidently based far more on one's outlook on a variety of domains that are being considered than on one's information. I make this improvement since an emphasis on a basic outlook on life almost suggests a GI is gripped by dark imaginations about life in general and that is certainly not the case for me. Finally, it is difficult to say what the end of leg work is. For some, the end is to harden one's previous opinion. For others, the end is to find a more adequate opinion. And there is everything in between.

You address the problematic of developing and creating opinions well. Despite these problematics, opinions are made and published. Experts give opinions. We (us) have expectations that these opinions are made in a manner and with resources that are superior to our own humble methods and resources. But if it is infantile to expect the opinion makers would look at every code with a magnifying glass, it seems reasonable to assume that they have, indeed, evaluated the generalized information available to them with certain intellectual openmindedness and perhaps even looked a bit deeper into information in a way not assessible to you or I. Ken assumes this much. Unfortunately, that's not always how expert or economic opinions are made.

Sincerely, Stan Faryna

-- Stan Faryna (faryna@groupmail.com), November 11, 1999.