Got this off the Tom Atlee List........................... Message From: cii@igc.apc.org (Tom Atlee) Date: Sat, Jul 17, 1999, 9:47pm To: cii@igc.org (undisclosed list) Subject: Union of Concerned Scientists Y2K nuke testimony http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=0013HW UCS White House presentation by David Lochbaum of Union of Concerned Scientists (posted on greenspun.com : LUSENET : Electric Utilities and Y2K July 07, 1999) Good afternoon. Thank you for this opportunity to present our views on this important safety matter. My name is David Lochbaum. I have been the Nuclear Safety Engineer for the Union of Concerned Scientists since October 1996. Prior to joining UCS, I worked as a nuclear engineer in the US commercial nuclear power industry for over 17 years. For more than a quarter century, UCS has been concerned about safety levels at US nuclear power plants because of the inherent dangers of the light water reactors. We are convinced that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is doing an unacceptable job of protecting the American public from the Y2K safety hazard. What happens if Y2K, or any other problem, triggers an accident at a US nuclear power plant? The Sandia National Laboratory, in a report released on November 1, 1982, by the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, estimated an accident at the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant in Maryland while it is running could produce 5,600 fatalities within a year, 23,000 additional cancer deaths after one year, and cost $90 billion (in 1980 dollars). The Brookhaven National Laboratory, in report released in August 1997 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, estimated an accident at a plant like Calvert Cliffs after being shut down for 3 * years could produce 29 fatalities within a year, 33,200 additional cancer deaths after one year, and cost $186 billion. These national laboratory studies illustrate that an accident at a nuclear power plant has extremely grave consequences - whether that plant is running or not. The worst US nuclear power plant accident occurred at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. An equipment problem interrupted the plant's feedwater flow. Emergency systems automatically started to compensate for the loss. Unfortunately, operators in the control room relied on a false indication of plant conditions and turned the emergency systems off. Within two hours, the irradiated fuel in the reactor core overheated and partially melted. Nearly 150,000 people evacuated their homes. Y2K can start any US nuclear power plant down the Three Mile Island pathway. The feedwater system at every nuclear power plant in the United States is Y2K vulnerable. Many of these systems use embedded chips and/or digital controls. All of these systems require the electrical grid to be available. Y2K can directly disable the feedwater system or it can indirectly disable the system by knocking out the electrical grid. As at Three Mile Island, emergency systems would automatically start upon failure of the feedwater system. These emergency systems can cool the reactor, but only if the operators allow them to function. The computer systems used by the operators to monitor plant conditions during much of their training and virtually all of their daily activities are susceptible to Y2K failures. Deprived of their normal method of monitoring plant conditions, the operators may not be able to get the necessary information from backup sources accurately and timely. Therefore, they might repeat the mistake made at Three Mile Island and turn the emergency systems off. I realize that this scenario strings together a few "ifs" to paint a gloomy picture. But it is not an inconceivable string of "ifs" - after all, it has already happened once in this country. In addition, this scenario is only one among several Y2K scenarios that start nuclear plants down the road toward an accident. The US has 103 operating nuclear power plants. A Y2K success rate of 75, 85, or even 95 percent will be unacceptable. One hundred percent of the plants must avoid a Y2K-triggered accident. Unfortunately, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is doing a bad job of ensuring that nuclear power plants will be ready for the new millennium. NRC inspectors conducted audits of Y2K preparations at nuclear power plants. Their very sincere efforts have been a huge waste of time. The inspectors have been told what to examine, but they have not been provided acceptance criteria. Therefore, these audits - which are more precisely termed sightseeing tours - cannot determine if the nuclear plants meet minimum safety standards. The NRC's Y2K performance really is truly that bad. NRC inspectors went to the Brunswick nuclear plant in North Carolina and learned that the plant's owner relied exclusively on certifications by companies supplying its hardware and software. Brunswick did no testing when it had a piece of paper saying that a computer system was Y2K compliant. The NRC inspectors then traveled to the Salem nuclear plant in New Jersey. At Salem, the plant owner tested some of the hardware and software that had been certified to be Y2K compliant. Some of the certified systems flunked the tests. The NRC knows that some nuclear plant owners are relying heavily on paperwork instead of testing. The NRC has documentation that this paperwork cannot always be trusted. The NRC is not unhappy about this situation. Why? Because in the NRC's eyes, no nuclear plant can be below Y2K minimum standards because there are no standards defined. Everyone passes an NRC test because there is no answer key. Another troubling sign is the NRC's treatment of three petitions for Y2K expedited rulemaking submitting by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) last December. The NRC told NIRS that they'd have a response to their petitions by the end of April, then the end of May, and then the end of June. NIRS has yet to receive the NRC's response. The NRC's foot-dragging on this national safety issue is inexcusable. We urge you to induce the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - an executive branch agency - to establish clearly defined minimum standards for Y2K and ensure that all plants meet or exceed those standards. A 99 percent success rate in avoiding a Y2K-triggered accident means that one nuclear plant somewhere in the United States may be checking Sandia or Brookhaven's body count estimates. Tom Atlee * The Co-Intelligence Institute * Oakland, CA http://www.co-intelligence.org http://www.co-intelligence.org/Y2K.html http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_Index.html

-- Tim Johnson (timca@webtv.net), July 18, 1999

Answers

If y2k is not fixed by now at the nuke plants, we must know now. If they cant pass a full y2k audit conducted by an independent team of specialist then serious contingency plans for taking all 103 plants to a phased safe shutdown until the rollover date, Then after the date change bring them up one plant at a time slowly. Peoples lives should be put over bottom line profit. A meltdown of all 103 plants would be totally unacceptable, It's not worth the risk. The Govt must be responsible about this one. If they dont work by now dont chance it. You cant see or feel radiation as it cooks your cells. I suffered medical problems from radiation exposure, It really sucks. You cant negotiate it away. They must do all they can to see to it that this doesnt become a problem. It takes 4 months to safely cool down those reactors. August is the time to decide what the right thing to do is. The whole world will be watching. We can live with a few power inconviences for a couple of months, But can we live with y2k broken reactors, that is the $64,000 question. The wise seeks understanding

-- y2k aware mike (y2k aware mike @ conservation . com), July 18, 1999.

"A meltdown of all 103 plants would be totally unacceptable."

How wonderfully understated. Luckily that won't happen.

So, how did you get that radiation? What was the dose? Where did you come up with that four month to shut down figure?

WWW.NRC.GOV has plenty of y2k information. Rather than quoting an anti-nuke lobby, take a look and see what YOUR opinion is.

-- nucpwr (nucpwr@hotmail.com), July 18, 1999.

So you found the anti-nuke sites. Bully for you.

Tell you what, why don't you do something. Add up all the deaths since 1940 caused in the United States (no fair counting other countries with lax safety standards or that use power nukes for making bomb material) by the various methods of power generation.

That will include:

Deaths caused by mining of coal and uranium.

Deaths caused by refining of uranium, and cleaning of coal.

Deaths caused by smoke and disposal of nuclear waste.

Deaths caused by dam collapse - the idea of hydroelectric not causing human death is a total myth.

Wind and Solar are not yet signifigant fractions of the total - leave them out.

Add up these deaths, divide by the total megakilowatt hours generated by each method. That is the real danger to humans of generating power by these methods. Nuclear will have the lowest actual danger, every time. And that is with nearly 50 years of data collected.

Oh yeah, I forgot - when confronted with a fact that doesn't agree with your prejudices, ignore it.

WC - come on boy, I'm missing the little attack dachshund. BOO HOO - what have I done that my attack dachshund has gone away?

-- Paul Davis (davisp1953@yahoo.com), July 18, 1999.

Link to the above mentioned thread

Paul Davis or nucpwr, could you please explain this:

"The Brookhaven National Laboratory, in report released in August 1997 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, estimated an accident at a plant like Calvert Cliffs after being shut down for 3 1/2 years could produce 29 fatalities within a year, 33,200 additional cancer deaths after one year, and cost $186 billion."

What type of an accident could cause those casualty numbers 3.5 YEARS after safe shutdown? And would those numbers increase if it was 3.5 months after safe shutdown?.. or 3.5 weeks after safe shutdown?.. or 3.5 days after safe shutdown?.. or 3.5 minutes after safe shutdown?

The NRC is loudly proclaiming that there are no issues that would prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear plants. But if the above Aug. 1997 NRC report is true then SO WHAT if they can shut down safely. There are still serious safely issues to consider.

-- Linda (lwmb@psln.com), July 18, 1999.

In case nuppwr and Mr. Davis missed it, the idea here is to prevent unnecessary suffering and death. It is not to preserve their ideology.

-- Brian McNeill (brian.mcneill@cwix.com), July 18, 1999.

The Late Great Planet Eartn. Anyone know another planet good for humans around here, or do I have to change form? Got an intergalactic shuttle schedule?

-- Mara Wayne (MaraWAyne@aol.com), July 18, 1999.

Brian, taking figures from a group that has nothing to contribute to any discussion of nuclear energy but noise about 'evil nukes' is not my idea of a scientific argument.

Linda, I haven't seen the Brookhaven report, but I would bet they are talking about a possible total loss of coolant in onsite waste storage facilities. That is a pretty big if - since it would take quite some time for coolant to evaporate entirely.

Brian, I don't have an idealogy re nuclear power. Frankly, I don't much care how my electricity is generated. But the public forum on Nuclear Power has been chock full of distortions and outright lies. Ever hear the one about nuclear waste taking tens of thousands of years to decay? And how we have never built anything that could store waste that long? True - if you wanted to make dinner plates out of the stuff. It only takes about 600 years to decay to the radiation level of high grade Uranium ore ie the radiation level it was when we took it from the ground - a much more correct measurement. And humans have most certainly built structures that have lasted much longer than 600 years - the pyramids being the extreme example.

Too many lies, not enough time.

-- Paul Davis (davisp1953@yahoo.com), July 18, 1999.

Nucpwr,

What is the typical shutdown sequence for a nuke, with some rough time frames? Then, once the rods are in the cooling pool, how long must they have water pumped through the pool in order to avoid a boil off? If the grid were to go down, how serious is this for the nuke plant? In other words, can you give us a basic scenario of what we need, and can expect, in case of a grid collapse?

-- Gordon (gpconnolly@aol.com), July 18, 1999.

The Union of Concerned Scientists is no more of an impartial source of technical data than its sponsors want it to be. You have a right to listen to it, but not on matters of nuclear opinion and projections.

For example, the calculated deaths from radiation released by buring coal have already exceed the theorectical number from that quoted study of Calvert Cliffs power plant. The actual number of preventable deaths from drunk drivers exceed that value EVERY TWO YEARS.

This is not a valid source of data on nuclear power and operations.

If you were to take these warnings on the vunerablilty of power plants seriously, I'd recommend you consider that EVERY fossil plant out there is vunverable to these same effects - but nobody wants to point out that the 4000 coal and oil powered plants vunerable to these year 2000 troubles are not only NOT being audited by ANYBODY, but many are not even reporting they have inventoried and remediated their systems.

___

We've covered it before, are you interested in the links?

To stop the chain reaction - less than 1 second.

To cool down to room temperature - 3 days max, more usually 36 hours. (On the smaller reactors I operated, I've done it in less than two shifts.)

From that point - any of several normal, emergency, and backup cooling systems are available - NONE of which - to the specific & expressed contrary despite the incorrect statement by the UCS above - depend on outside power. (If available, the utilities prefer to use outside power - its cheaper than emergency diesels or other systems, and will almost always be used first.)

Pool cooldown is usually kept always on service during maintenance shutdown, but the dacy heat after 4 days is 0.02% of initial heat, and so there actually almost no heat being removed to the cooling systems.

If the core is "open" - as is usual in almost all shutdowns for refueling - the water will never get above 212 degrees, and the core (or fuel storage pool) could actually be kept cool by dumping more clean water into it - by gravity if need be.

To cool to the point where core decay heat is neglible - to where ambiant losses exceed the heat generated from the core - 4 to 6 weeks.

(In fact, at Three Mile Island, running the coolant pumps to try to keep the core cool after three weeks actually began to raise water temperature - the power required to run the pump put more energy in the water than the reactor decay heat did. We used to run full pressure steam tests without running the reactor at all by simply heating up the plant with the reactor pumps - then using the pumps to keep generating heat to keep steaming. This requires shore power, and usually outside assistance, but is routinely done in new construction.)

-- Robert A Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), July 18, 1999.

The NRC and the nuclear power industry has reported that no y2k bugs that could have prevented safety systems from functioning have been found at any US commercial nuclear power plants.

This is consistent with the only minor date logging/stamping/screen display date problems we found at several plants I have been involved with on y2k. In fact, in reviewing industry y2k test reports and other industry data, I found no evidence of a y2k bug in the non- safety systems significant enough to cause a component to fail to perform its intended function, much less directly cause a plant trip. (Not saying such a component isn't out there, but the chances grow slimmer and slimmer as the remaining plants complete their grand total of 58 items).

For an in depth look at the y2k status of each plant, see http://www.n ei.org/library/y2k_readinessreport.pdf. Take a look at what systems and software are remaining for Y2K readiness at any plant you have concerns about. For the whole of the nuclear industry, 58 remaining systems/software to be remediated is extremely small - and the y2k bugs are likely to be minor based on my experiences with a number of the systems and software listed, and based on the information provided by each of the plants.

Of course, if you just hate nuclear energy, Y2K is a serious threat ;) If you truly have concerns about Y2k and nuclear power, the topic is addressed frequently on the forum at http://www.euy2k.com. Some of the best discussions are older, so you may want to look at the older nuclear power threads or do a search.

And Mike...4 months? ;)

Regards,

-- FactFinder (FactFinder@bzn.com), July 18, 1999.

Robert and FactFinder,

Thanks for that summary. I have a feeling you may be repeating these statements in the months ahead as more and more folks try harder to come up to speed on this matter. And that includes me. Now, if either of you know, where in the heck did that 4+ months for cool-down business come from? Any idea as to why there were such statements being made? From what you are saying it would appear that I have been wrong in my thinking about this whole scram and cool operation. But, in this case I don't mind being corrected one bit. I'm surrounded by these buggers and depend heavily on them for my energy needs.

-- Gordon (gpconnolly@aol.com), July 19, 1999.

Robert,

Thanks, I always look for your interrpretation of the idea presents. Help me remain calm!:>

-- Moore Dinty moore (not@thistime.com), July 19, 1999.

Robert, you are the man.

Gordon, these statements are made by people who don't know the truth. Or don't want the truth to be known.

-- nucpwr (nucpwr@hotmail.com), July 20, 1999.