This may have been brought up on this forum before and I just missed it; certainly it was discussed over at Rick Cowles's forum (www.euy2k.com) on Y2K and electric power. Regardless, it is of sufficient importance to be put before this forum again, especially for newcomers.

ABB is the Swiss-based engineering giant that supplies all kinds of electrical and digital equipment to power companies around the world; a $30 billion company, ABB has 200,000 employees in 100 countries and is currently undertaking major Y2K remediation/information projects for many different power companies. ABB has conducted all sorts of tests on vital power company equipment at many different levels and in many different systems; ABB also conducts complex computer simulations and "what if" scenarios. In the January 1999 issue of the "ABB Review," Dr. Klaus Ragaller, one of ABB's chief scientists and a member of its Year 2000 Task Force, wrote a lengthy and quite detailed summary of ABB's findings to date; you may access this report at www2.abb.ch/GLOBAL/CHIBM/CHIBM007.NSF/Y2K/F1 It is the single best, most authoritative document I have ever seen on the entire issue of Y2K and electrical power systems. As you might expect, there is good news and bad news.

The bad news is that some Y2K problems, unfixed, can indeed take down (trip) some power plants, especially the newer, more complex plants with DCS (distributed control systems). No ifs, ands, or buts. One ABB computer simulation (perhaps a "worst case scenario") involves seeing what would happen to a power grid if 10% of power plants went offline more or less simultaneously. (The U.S. has about 15% excess capacity, if all power plants are available.) Faulty alarms caused by Y2K problems (witness what happened to a large Brazilian hydro power plant during a recent Y2K test) could also force managers to shut down a power plant temporarily, even if there was nothing actually wrong. There are also some Y2K problems with operator stations in network control centers (for monitoring grid status, load management, etc.) and with communications links to some substations (for feedback purposes). Y2K problems may also surface in peripheral but nonetheless significant (especially for regulatory/safety control purposes) systems in nuclear plants. As you probably know, the NRC will delay until this fall any decision about shutting down any U.S. nuclear power plants; Rick Cowles presently seems of the opinion that the NRC will not shut down any nuke before 2000.

The good news is that there appear to be very few serious Y2K problems in the T&D (transmission and distribution) systems themselves, which reinforces the findings and positions of NERC, EPRI, Dick Mills, and various power company engineers who routinely post on Cowles's forum. Because of some possible communications or feedback problems, there could conceivably be occasional instances where a grid becomes somewhat less stable or where monitoring info is less reliable; if there was then an unlikely combination of bad events (including, say, outside stresses like solar flares), then there could be "cascading effects" resulting in power outages. ABB stresses the need to train power company employees to handle emergencies.

The ABB report is a fairly difficult document for a nontechnical outsider (like yours truly), and no doubt different readers will interpret it in different ways. To me, the good news generally outweighs the bad news here: ABB repeatedly stresses the robustness and resiliency of power grid systems, and the general intimation is that if power companies conscientiously do what they are supposed to do in the way of Y2K remediation and testing, plus contingency planning, then any power outages next year should be minimal and, if they do occur, of relatively short duration (such is my general impression from this report, anyway--your impression might vary!). Granted, there are some serious "ifs" in that sentence, and I doubt that ABB would wish to make specific predictions about specific power companies. Besides, as Dick Mills noted the other day in his "farewell" power article for "Westergaard," we also have to remember that even a power company that is completely "ready" may be plagued by some residual errors (missed Y2K problems or bad fixes); Mills thinks that if there are any power outages, they will be regional, not just local, but he also thinks they will be of short duration: a few hours to, at most, three days is his personal prediction. Remember, the ABB research generally found that the most serious Y2K problems are in individual power plants themselves; because of excess capacity and the ability to re-route power, a number of power plants can experience problems or even go down without actually causing blackouts.

Partly because of this ABB report, I am considerably less worried about electrical power systems in the U.S. and other advanced countries than I was six months or a year ago. (Still have some serious questions about oil, natural gas, and water, however, at least for specific localities.). When reading the ABB report, I did often wonder about the Y2K status of power companies in many other countries, especially those "in-between" (i.e., major developing) countries whose larger power plants might very easily have Y2K-vulnerable DCS. It makes the CIA and NIC concerns about foreign power grids quite understandable.

Anyway, the ABB report is one that each person will probably want to study and interpret for himself/herself.

-- Don Florence (dflorence@zianet.com), June 28, 1999

Answers

Thanks Don

http:// www2.abb.ch/GLOBAL/CHIBM/CHIBM007.NSF/Y2K/F1

The Year 2000 threat to the electrical grid

-- Brian (imager@home.com), June 28, 1999.

Don,

Balanced and fair. Be careful, you'll develop a reputation. The "iron triangle" arguments are no longer de rigueur, at least for the U.S.

Regards,

-- Mr. Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), June 28, 1999.