Listening again to Stuart Rodmans segment on Art Bell's program earlier this week about NERCs 1/11/99 Second Quarterly Report, Rodman brought up some points that I havent seen anyone else pick up on. (I apologize if it is old news somehow.) I checked back to see what NERC actually said. The quotes are from NERCs site:

NERCs Y2K Plan

"Within each Interconnection, power production and delivery systems are highly interdependent. In general, systems are operated such that the loss of one facility, or in some cases two or three facilities, will not cause cascading outages. Y2K poses the threat that common mode failures (such as all generator protection relays of a particular model failing simultaneously) or the coincident loss of multiple failures may result in stressing the electric system to the point of a cascading outage over a large area" "NERC and the Regions will coordinate the preparation of operating plans to mitigate the consequences of any adverse Y2K problems. Examples may include placing all available transmission facilities in service, bringing additional generators on line, increased use of older analog controlled units, providing additional staff at control centers, power stations, and critical substations, and operating with reduced electricity transfers. The critical Y2K operating period is likely to extend several weeks before and after midnight December 31, 1999." Rodmans first point was that NERC is most concerned about the possibility of "common mode failures". Presumably, relatively few vendors supplied chips used by the industry, so a failure in one chip is likely to be experienced in a relatively large amount of equipment. (Someone working for one the northwest hydro utilities called in to say that there would have to be some level of fix-on-failure because it would not be possible to find all the chips ahead of time.) Rodmans second point was that NERC wants to minimize the occurrence of electricity transfers, which Rodman believes reflects a concern by NERC that too much transfer would aggravate a common mode failure. Rodmans third point was that he expects one of things NERC will do will be to ration the load for the period 2 weeks and after New Years. (Right now, NERCs "Under Development" contingency plan is for several weeks in either direction.) Rodman had an interesting story to tell about Christmas 89 when a deep freeze hit the country. Rodman was in Tampa, where it plummeted to 17 degrees. The front reached Tampa last. Along the way, the extreme temperatures caused regions to sequentially bleed power from points to the south. By the time the front hit Tampa, there was nowhere else to borrow energy from. Tampa and surrounding counties experienced rationing for a couple days. Electricity alternated an hour on, an hour off. It wouldnt have been so bad, but since this was assumed to be a period of light load, some of the local utility plants were off-line for scheduled maintenance. (Granted, NERC is planning to have more utilities on line just in case, but somewhere in the report NERC points out that too much available electricity can also be a problem.) Rodmans story wrapped up with the sad tale that by the time the turkey came out of the oven (12 hours later), it wasn't fit to eat. I have been amusedly imaging the reaction of the American populace (DGIs/DWGIs) to this level of an planned! inconvenience during the Holidays. Even if the rollover goes smoothly on every other account, Im betting it will be considered absolutely inexcusable! How could "they" let this happen!! At some point NERC would have to warn the public to forget about a traditional turkey dinner. Hows that for when TSHTF?? I'm relieved to see that NERC has an extensive contingency plan in mind. Also that apparently 98% of the utilities are now participating at some level (as of NERC's first report last September it was only 75%). Somehow, however, the level of contingency planning suggests to me that the level of complacency by Koskinen and NERC's spin doctors isn't justified. Meanwhile, Im still worried about those darn chips...

-- Brooks (brooksbie@hotmail.com), January 15, 1999

Answers

Sorry, let me try to do it with paragraphs (I hope!!)... Listening again to Stuart Rodmans segment on Art Bells program earlier this week about NERCs 1/11/99 Second Quarterly Report, Rodman brought up some points that I havent seen anyone else pick up on. (I apologize if it is old news.) I checked back to see what NERC actually said. The quotes are from NERCs site. "Within each Interconnection, power production and delivery systems are highly interdependent. In general, systems are operated such that the loss of one facility, or in some cases two or three facilities, will not cause cascading outages. Y2K poses the threat that common mode failures (such as all generator protection relays of a particular model failing simultaneously) or the coincident loss of multiple failures may result in stressing the electric system to the point of a cascading outage over a large area" "NERC and the Regions will coordinate the preparation of operating plans to mitigate the consequences of any adverse Y2K problems. Examples may include placing all available transmission facilities in service, bringing additional generators on line, increased use of older analog controlled units, providing additional staff at control centers, power stations, and critical substations, and operating with reduced electricity transfers. The critical Y2K operating period is likely to extend several weeks before and after midnight December 31, 1999." Rodmans first point is that NERC is most concerned about the possibility of "common mode failures". Relatively few vendors supplied chips used by the industry, so a failure in one chip is likely to be experienced in a relatively large amount of equipment. (Someone working for on the northwest utilities called up to say that there would have to be some level of fix-on-failure because it would not be possible to find all the chips ahead of time.) Rodmans second point is that NERC wants to minimize the occurrence of electricity transfers, which Rodman believes reflects a concern by NERC that too much transfer will aggravate any wide spread chip problems. Rodmans third point is that he expects NERC to ration the load for the period 2 weeks and after New Years. (Right now, NERCs "Under Development" contingency plan is for several weeks in either direction.) Rodman had an interesting story to tell about Christmas 89 when a deep freeze hit the country. Rodman was in Tampa, where it plummeted to 17 degrees. The front reached Tampa last. Along the way, the extreme temperatures caused regions to sequentially bleed power from points to the south. By the time the front hit Tampa, there was nowhere else to borrow from energy from. Tampa and surrounding counties experienced rationing for a couple days. Electricity alternated on for an hour, off for an hour. It wouldnt have been so bad, but since this was assumed to be a period of light load, some of the local utility plants were off-line for scheduled maintenance. (Granted, NERC is planning to have more utilities on line just in case, but somewhere in the report NERC points out that too much available electricity can also be a problem.) Rodmans story wrapped up with the sad tale that by the time the turkey came out of the oven (12 hours later), it wasn't fit to eat. I have been amusedly imaging the reaction of the American populace to this level of an planned! inconvenience during the Holidays. Even if the rollover goes smoothly on every other account, Im betting it will be considered absolutely inexcusable by many DGIs/DWGIs. How could "they" let this happen!! At some point NERC would have to inform the public to forget about a traditional turkey dinner. Hows that for a when TSHTF?? Meanwhile, Im still worried about those darn chips

NERCs Y2K Plan

-- Brooks (brooksbie@hotmail.com), January 15, 1999.

Brooks -

Use 2 carriage returns to ensure that paragraphs are separated.

-- Mac (sneak@lurk.com), January 15, 1999.

If you use the paragraph tag ( '<p>' ) ANYWHERE in a post, then ALL paragraphs must be separated by a paragraph tag (Your indented hotlink contains said paragraph tag.)

-- Arnie Rimmer (arnie_rimmer@usa.net), January 15, 1999.