Here is the new Kiplingers piece I referred to in another thread.

Can anyone find any corroboration?

http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/1999/January/y2k11.htm

snip Natural gas. Inside those dark-green metal boxes on city streets or in brick buildings in the middle of nowhere are devices that monitor pressure in natural-gas pipelines, automatically releasing gas into the atmosphere to prevent the pipes from cracking. These devices care what day it is because they keep a time record of their activities that is monitored to see if a serious problem is developing. Most can't read the year 2000 and, sensing an error, will stop working on January 1, 2000, if they're not updated. Pressure in the pipes could still be relieved manually. But in a worst-case scenario, the pressure could build to the point that the pipe would burst, spewing natural gas into the air. That, in turn, could cause a massive explosion. end snip

Gartner Group MIGHT be the source of that info (a different page in the same article discusses natural gas distribution problems): http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/1999/January/y2k6.htm

BUT As I said in my original post on a different thread: Now this is pretty high-powered stuff to toss around without naming sources, but the rest of the article seemed pretty level-headed. I'm not a regular reader of Kiplinger's, so I don't have a sense of there journalistic standards

PLEASE: Don't any of you put this out as God's Own Truth until someone can find some corroboration. There are enough Urban Legends out there already. (Non-compliant Microwaves my arse. )"

And another thing: Gartner Group's Y2K research is widely quoted as Proof of Our Collective Impending Doom, but their advice on Y2K personal preparedness is actually quite low key. It's unwise to selectively quote sources. Look it over and add it to your OpinionBase about how Y2K might affect you.

http://gartner6.gartnerweb.com/public/static/home/00073955.html#0009

Her's their summary:

snip Individuals in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and the United States will have some disruption, inconvenience and discontinuities during the first week of January 2000. The biggest risk is from failures and outages of telephone and power service, but the rest should be manageable. Countries in Asia, Latin America and emerging countries will have a potentially larger disruptions because businesses and governments in those areas are behind in fixing the mission-critical functions.

The largest enterprises - e.g., banks, retailers, distributors and manufacturers - in a country will generally be most prepared and have the lowest risk factors. The same is true for most large multinational enterprises. Most of those enterprises started to prepare early and have had the resources to fix at least their mission-critical systems. Failure of critical government systems continues to pose the greatest risk.

Individuals should make a contingency plan based on the risks for their country. Travel throughout the world in January 2000 should be deferred if possible. The progress in solving year 2000 problems by banks and investment companies should be monitored. GartnerGroup does not recommend liquidating assets or withdrawing all funds from banks.

The greatest risks to most individuals are:

Being employed by an enterprise that, because of poor year 2000 preparation, suffers significant damage (e.g., business interruption or legal damages) that jeopardizes future employment.

- Small enterprises are further behind than midsize and large enterprises. Individuals should maintain awareness of the status of their employers' year 2000 compliance status.

From participating in panic actions, rather than an actual failure.

- Participating in such actions will be of little benefit in the short or long run. Actual failures will be less than feared by most individuals.

- Be extra careful about scams and unqualified advice.

- Be aware that the broadcast news and business press may have a very pessimistic outlook because of information given by those with vested interests - e.g., year 2000 service and software vendors, private consultants and consulting companies. endsnip

Some of the best advice I've heard from a very knowledgable source.

Final thought: Always remember that: speed of bad news = speed of good news*10

-- Lewis (aslanshow@yahoo.com), December 21, 1998

Answers

I can't specifically address the question of just how embedded systems function in natural gas pipelines, valves, pressure meters, etc., except to say that I've seen similar comments elsewhere. From all I've read, and I've been doing extensive Y2K research since April, there does seem to be a quite significant (albeit probably not catastrophic) embedded system problem in all utility systems: natural gas, oil, electric, and water.

Re Gartner: I've tracked thousands of articles and reports since April, including Gartner's data, and I see no reason for Gartner's recent optimism. Trends projected from last spring have basically been what one would expect. I won't go into detail here, because other threads in this forum have already amply discussed the rather schizophrenic nature of Gartner's recent statements. And various programmers have already dismissed as balderdash Gartner's glib assumption that 90% of failures will be corrected within 3 days at the start of 2000.

Gartner is right to point out that self-serving prophets of doom should not be listened to, though it should also be pointed out that many individuals and organizations, including perhaps Gartner, have recently adopted a philosophy of "we must not panic the public no matter what the truth of the matter is." (This is also the credo of Sen. Bennett and John Koskinen.) As Yourdon has noted, nobody really has a crystal ball on Y2K; my personal opinion is that we're in serious trouble.

It's interesting that Gartner thinks that major U.S. companies are in such great shape on Y2K, because that is not what these companies' own latest 10Q SEC filings show. Their 10Q Y2K statements, still rather couched in legalese and boilerplate generalizations of course, indicate that, on average, Fortune 500 companies have thus far spent only 30-35% of their allocated Y2K budgets. I don't think this is because Y2K is somehow proving less costly than originally anticipated; in fact, Y2K costs for most major companiesk keep spiraling upward. Witness Sears, Citibank, AT&T, etc. In just the past year, AT&T's projected Y2K costs have gone from $300 million to $900 million. Given such facts, and given that companies naturally tend to inflate Y2K progress reports and put the best possible face on their Y2K programs in their 10Q reports (to be read by investors, remember), I think it's safe to say that there's rough water ahead.

So bad news always travels at 10X the speed of good news? Hmm, that must explain why we have a grossly overvalued stock market and why the American public has yet to understand the severity of the global economic crisis and the looming world liquidity/credit crunch. Recent polls (you know, one every hour) tend to show that most Americans are complacent, confident (if not downright arrogant), and happy in their assessment of the future.

They may have an unpleasant surprise.

-- Don Florence (dflorence@zianet.com), December 21, 1998.

Most professionals who have no axe to grind are coming down on the light side of a 4 on the Diane scale.

The stock market goes irrational once in a while - just one of those things. Don't think anyone really knows why.

-- Paul Davis (davisp1953@yahoo.com), December 21, 1998.

Here is some information on the natural gas supply line.

from: http://www.modcomp.co.uk/industrial_comms/natural.html

The following is provided in case the link goes down. Any questions?

Mike

Natural Gas Distribution

Problem A large natural gas distribution firm operates in New Hampshire and Vermont with 1100 miles of pipeline, 65,000 residential customers, and 100 large usage customers. They presently have 120 pressure transmitters, 15 RTUs, and 23 high accuracy flow meter s for custody transfers. They need to buy gas through long term and spot market contracts to supply their customers' varying needs. Purchased gas can be delivered to their system at any of 4 points and they have 5 gas storage facilities. The gas is del ivered by the TN Gas Transmission Companies (TGTC), and the regional distributor has a link to the TGTC computer. There are severe economic and political penalties for having too little gas to deliver to their customers especially during the harsh New En gland winters. Purchasing too much gas and having to refuse delivery is also very costly.

Previously they dispatched trucks to get pressure and flow readings and to adjust flowmeters as needed, but this was slow, expensive, and even unreliable during the winter. They needed a modern, economical Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to remotely monitor and control the flow of gas. They have 5 regional operations centers that each control distribution within their area, yet all 5 regions must work together to purchase and deliver gas as their customers need it. The firm must also provide accurate and timely regulatory reports to the NH and VT PUCs and must document their costs to justify the rates they charge.

Recently several large customers began buying their natural gas directly from gulf coast producers, and the PUCs require the distributor to deliver this gas. They now have to track how much is received from these additional suppliers, and match that with the usage from these large customers. Within a few years they expect most large customers to begin purchasing their gas directly from producers and the tracking workload will continue to increase.

Solution

This firm chose to install a SCADA computer in each of their 5 distribution centers to manage the gas flows in that area. Each can function autonomously, but all 5 are tied together using the company's existing fractional T1 data links. The centers each have several auto-dial modems that call each meter in their region at least hourly to get current flow, temperature and pressure readings as shown in Figure 2. Several meters are on-line to provide continuous flow data. The computer must correct the vol umetric flow readings for the effect of seasonal fluctuations in temperature and pressure on gas density.

At each center they have several PCs tied via local Ethernet TCP LAN to that center's SCADA computer. Operators, engineers, and managers now have instant access to current and historical data and can make better decisions about how much gas to buy, where to have it delivered, and how to distribute it to their customers. As demand changes, they can adjust delivery and flows to keep the system running smoothly.

AccessWare application software on the SCADA computers generates the status displays and trend plots for the users. It also keeps a historical file that RRIML uses to prepare detailed reports for management and summary reports for the NH and VT PUCs. RR IML also sends the data to an Informix database for long term storage.

The operators like the "point and click" mouse driven displays that do not require them to learn complex computer commands. The system manager likes the ease of configuring the screens and the capability to directly import bit maps and AutoCAD drawings a s needed for additional displays. Operators at any of the 5 centers have access to conditions throughout the entire distribution system, yet if the communications links are down, each center can function independently until the links are restored.

-- mike (justmike11@yahoo.com), December 21, 1998.

It doesn't look good from any standpoint - with respect to survival as a entire system (financially viable system that is) if subordinate infrastrucutre is striken. The data flow, central controls, loss of remote site independent control (the trucks and hand adjustment were taken out of service, but could have been a backup under extreme conditions) and inter-reliance on the independent sellers and users of natural gas (as demanded by the PUC's) all brew exceptional trouble.

See, a single company - distributing gas from one source, sending it the its customers, billing its customers, and controlling its own destiny independently - can test things, can adjust things and adjust for losses or power losses (transmission losses) in their own locality. The more interlaced the network becomes - the more likely it is to fail when interdependencies fail at spots out of local control.

For example, a repair crew (or network crew) now has to interface adn rely on data from all these other companies just to figure out whether there is sufficient gas pressure in a gas line to pass to a second network. An bill for the intake, and the outgo, accurately or the company goes out of business/gets sued for non-delivery/sued for inaccurate billing.

The closer a company is to its product and controls, the more likely it will be to be able to adjust things manually. The SCADA system here is essential in getting the gas network to run in normal times via the regional centers and instant communication, so how can it run when the SCADA is affected by infrastructure failure and communication delays/power failures?

-- Robert A. Cook, P.E. (Kennesaw GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 21, 1998.

Back to the original "green boxes that monitor pressure and automatically release gas to the atmosphere when necessary". ROFL.

Don't know whether to laugh or cry. It's garbage, and so by implication is the rest.

Anyone with the faintest grasp of reality would realise that (a) the released gas would be a major fire or explosion hazard, (b) you'd smell it and dial emergency services, and (c) even if neither of the above, it would be the equivalent of a bank throwing out worn banknotes in the trash. If the green boxes are what I think, they are the junction boxes for telephone and cable-TV wiring.

Yes, gas grids do have embedded systems problems that need to be addressed: in production and in long-distance transportation. The local town distribution system hasn't changed since Victorian days, and involves no pumps and no necessary electronic control.

-- Nigel Arnot (nra@maxwell.ph.kcl.ac.uk), December 22, 1998.

"You'd smell it and dial emergency service"... if the phones are up.

-- Shimrod (shimrod@lycosmail.com), December 22, 1998.

Sorry for my delayed comments after posing a question. Tis the season...

Don Florence said:

"...Re: Gartner: ... the rather schizophrenic nature of Gartner's recent statements."...

I agree their conclusions don't always seem to jibe with their "facts", but then that no longer surprises me when reading Y2K analyses. I just feel that it is important to consider everything a source has to say, not just the bits that coincide with one's pre-existing opinions. It's very hard to do. I'm not good at it.

..."And various programmers have already dismissed as balderdash Gartner's glib assumption that 90% of failures will be corrected within 3 days at the start of 2000."...

I'm not sure about 90%, but as an application developer, I can tell you that fixing bugs _after_ they cause problems is generally easier. (At least for the programmer...) The following is a generalization, but bear with me: If the application is written with reasonably good error-handling routines, a broken app will generally tell you roughly where the error happened. If, (as is more common with Y2K related errors), the app "works" but generates wrong values, one can generally follow the bad data back to the part of the program which created it.

Walk into a Doctor's office and say:

"Doc, I'm going to die from a fatal illness in a year. Find out why, and fix it."

To which the kindly doctor replies "OK. What are your symptoms?" "None", you say slapping your washboard belly. "Fit as a fiddle." Clearly, finding and fixing an asymptomatic illness takes much longer and costs much more than one with obvious indicators.

"...self-serving prophets of doom should not be listened to..." Don refers an extremely point. IMHO, most of the FUD mongers believed that The UN would blackmail Clinton into using FEMA authorized ATF thugs to confiscate our guns. (or similar foolishness) BEFORE they ever heard of Y2K. They just find that Y2K is great way to spread their message.

And the trickle-down is startling. I've lurked on this board for a long time, and I amazed at how often the posters reveal truly paranoid perspectives. Paul, I'm not lumping you in that group by any means, but I don't think that efforts to minimize panic are a bad thing. We'd probably complain if they _didn't- do it.

I have an old AOL account I use for FTP occasionally, and on a whim I typed in "Y2K" as a keyword. It led to a set of Y2K discussion boards.

My God.

Those poor sods, coming to Y2K just now are believing every Urban Legend that comes down the pike and many are pathetically terrified. If it's an indicator of what wide-scale public opinion could become soon, I don't mind soothing words from Koskinen et al as long as the real work is getting done.

..."As Yourdon has noted, nobody really has a crystal ball on Y2K; my personal opinion is that we're in serious trouble."...

I completely agree, although I no longer feel that we are in trouble the way someone having a heart attack is in trouble. (Everything dependent dying after critical failure) I think cancer is a better analogy. A long, drawn out, ugly process filled with fear and dashed hopes punctuated by moments of beautiful kindness and clarity. With an indeterminate outcome.

But tenacity and a positive attitude help.

but I digress..

IMHO western media has carried the credo "If it bleeds, it leads" to absurd lengths, and any recent political campaign teaches the force of negative ideas. The examples of bad news not travelling at all posted by Don are an important illustration of the role of denial that I didn't think of in my original post. People _do_ hear what they want (or expect) to hear. International finance is an area so complex that I'm not sure anyone _can_ understand any longer. It may well be a house of cards.

Paul Davis' comments echo my own perspective at the moment. Although to me I think the most unnerving thing about the whole issue is that here we are, only a year out, and the only fact we all agree to is that _no one_ has a fact-based understanding of the actual scale of the problem. That's amazing.

Re: natural gas

Mike- An outstanding bit of sleuthing on your part. I'm originally from New England, have family there, and that is the clearest description of the distribution system I've read. Thanks! I guess...

Robert, I think your analysis is dead-on. The greater the complexity, the more points of potential failure and the more difficult the work-arounds.

And Nigel, your probably right about the Urban Legend aspect of the "Green Boxes". That's why I posted it to see if anyone had any concrete info. (Unfortunately, Mike's info was scarier...) I don't recall earlier discussions on that topic, but I probably missed it. Sorry if I was being redundant. Although I agree with Shimrod that calling emergency services is not a solution to rely on. Particularly if it were a widespread problem.

In any case, thank you all for your thoughtful replies. I for one am going to try have Christmas by ignoring Y2K. for a few days. I hope.

Happy Holidays to all.

-- Lewis (aslanshow@yahoo.com), December 23, 1998.

Kiplinger's stuff about ATMs on that same page is not as bogus as their "dark-green metal boxes on city streets ... devices that monitor pressure in natural-gas pipelines" (Did somebody get into Kiplinger's site and plant that??), but mainly because of the lesser probability of a public safety hazard if it were correct.

Kiplinger>if the machine can't read the date, it will sense an error

ATMs each have a little computer inside with a little clock just like your PC does. How often do you find that your PC "can't read the date"? That's not a Y2K problem -- that's a (rare) _hardware malfunction_.

So why is this listed as being one of "three real millennium threats" as stated in an earlier paragraph on that page?

Kiplinger>the transaction could be interrupted.

Having your transaction interrupted, which would probably be quickly apparent to you, is preferable to having its data corrupted (a more likely Y2K effect), which might take you a long time to detect and correct.

-- No Spam Please (anon@ymous.com), December 23, 1998.

No Spam said and I quote:

"Kiplinger's stuff about ATMs on that same page is not as bogus as their "dark-green metal boxes on city streets ... devices that monitorpressure in natural-gas pipelines" (Did somebody get into Kiplinger's site and plant that??), but mainly because of the lesser probability of a public safety hazard if it were correct. "

No, Kiplinger's Site wasn't spoofed-I read it in an honest to gosh dead-tree version of the article.

It does sound a bit wonky, though.

-- Lewis (aslanshow@yahoo.com), December 30, 1998.