NEWS ADVISORY Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington, DC 20036 202-328-0002; fax: 202-462-2183; nirsnet@nirs.org, www.nirs.org

Press Conference on Nuclear Power and Y2K

1 PM, Thursday, December 10, 1998

Zenger Room, National Press Building, Washington DC

The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), a national nuclear power watchdog organization, will hold a press conference to announce the submission of three emergency petitions for rulemaking to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These three petitions address different issues related to the Y2K computer bug and its potential affects on the nation's atomic power reactors. The petitions are part of a formal legal process that may result in the adoption of new NRC rules.

After several months of research into the Y2K issue, NIRS believes there is an increasing possibility that some nuclear reactors will not be "Y2K compliant" by January 1, 2000. There also is an increasing possibility that there may be disruptions of the electrical power grid, with potential safety ramifications for atomic reactors. The probabilities of such events are well within the probabilities for which the NRC requires nuclear safety regulations. NIRS' petitions attempt to address these issues.

For more information, call: Michael Mariotte, Mary Olson or Paul Gunter, 202.328.0002

NEWS FROM NIRS Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington DC 20036 202-328-0002; fax: 202-462-2183; nirsnet@nirs.org, www.nirs.org

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Michael Mariotte, Paul Gunter, Mary Olson December 10, 1998 202-328-0002

NAT'L GROUP SUBMITS THREE EMERGENCY RULEMAKINGS TO NRC

Y2K COMPUTER BUG MAY AFFECT SAFETY OF ATOMIC REACTORS AND ABILITY TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Washington, DC. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) today submitted three emer-gency petitions for rulemaking to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to address problems that may be caused to atomic power reactors and the electric power grid by the Y2K computer bug.

"The Y2K computer problem is greater than most people imagined even a year ago," said NIRS' execu-tive director Michael Mariotte, "and it is becoming clear that not every nuclear utility will be Y2K com-pliant in time for the millennium. Further, the possibility of electrical grid instability and local and re-gional blackouts cannot be ruled out, and nuclear power reactors require large amounts of electricity for essential cooling even when closed. Moreover, few-if any-utilities have actually tested emergency plans to cope with potential Y2K difficulties. Our petitions address each of these issues."

The first NIRS petition would require the NRC to close by December 1, 1999 any reactor that cannot prove, through full testing, that it is Y2K compliant until it can prove such compliance. The second peti-tion would require nuclear utilities to install additional backup power units to ensure a steady supply of electricity to reactors. The third petition would require each utility to engage in a full-scale emergency response exercise during 1999 in which plant personnel must attempt to address a Y2K-related problem.

The petitions were submitted under 10 CFR 2.802, a formal legal process that can lead to the establish-ment of binding regulations. NIRS requested that the petitions be treated in an expedited manner.

"The nuclear industry and the NRC say they are working diligently to resolve the Y2K problem," said Mariotte, "and we believe them. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the problem is so large that not every nuclear utility is likely to complete their work in time. The actions we are requesting today are prudent, modest steps-some would say too modest-to help ensure that the Y2K computer bug does not lead to catastrophe. The probabilities of severeY2K problems for some nuclear utilities fall well within the prob-abilities for which the NRC has promulgated other major safety rules."

"The NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) consistently have said that they have not identified any Y2K safety-related issues at nuclear reactors," said Paul Gunter, Director of NIRS' Reactor Watchdog Project. "But a November 6, 1998 audit of Y2K issues at the Seabrook, New Hampshire reactor found 12 safety-related systems affected by the Y2K bug, another 13 systems that could cause a reactor trip, and more than 800 affected systems "significant to business.

"A key issue for all nuclear utilities, even those able to put their house in order, is stability of the electri-cal grid," said Gunter. "There are thousands of utilities and independent power generators in the U.S. and Canada and it is highly unlikely all will resolve their Y2K problems in time. Instability of the grid could lead to local and regional blackouts, and the NRC has identified [in NUREG-1150, the agency's basic safety document] station blackout as the single largest contributor to risk at many reactors."

Gunter explained that nuclear utilities typically use diesel-powered generators to provide necessary power to cool reactor cores in the event of a blackout. This cooling power is necessary for months even when reactors are shut down. But a NIRS investigation of the generators, attached as an appendix to the peti-tion, found that they frequently don't work and are subject to multitudes of problems. "This is just the tip of the iceberg," said Gunter, "our investigation of these generators is continuing and we are finding they are even less reliable than we had believed."

High-level atomic waste fuel pools at every reactor site also must be cooled; otherwise, the water cover-ing the fuel rods could boil off, and their lethal radioactive inventory released. "The NRC currently does not even require that these fuel pools have back-up power," noted NIRS radioactive waste specialist Mary Olson. "But any extended blackout would place these pools at severe risk. We are demanding that the NRC add backup power capability, and to classify these pools as safety-related and requiring cooling."

Mariotte noted that current rules only require nuclear utilities to conduct emergency plan exercises once every two years, meaning that half the nation's utilities will not even address the Y2K issue in their exer-cises unless the rule is changed. "Every utility must have hands-on experience in coping with these is-sues," Mariotte said. "The unpredictability of how systems may respond to Y2K bugs, questions of the reliability of off-site emergency responders, including telecommunications, fire, police and other officials, all beg for additional training and practice."

"We are not suggesting people head for the hills at the Millennium," said Mariotte. "But when I was a Boy Scout, the motto was 'Be Prepared' and right now we aren't prepared. The potential problems are real, and deserve the type of measured and appropriate response we are urging today. It clearly would be irresponsible and negligent to allow non-Y2K compliant reactors to operate, and we trust the NRC will agree with us on that. It is also simple prudence to require emergency plan exercises and additional back-up power sources. It is perhaps ironic that it may require renewable energy resources to rescue the nuclear power industry from its own shortcomings, but the future begins now."

Mariotte noted that some Y2K-related problems may surface even before January 1, 2000. A Swedish utility recently turned its computer clocks to January 1, 1999, and its reactor unexpectedly shut down. "It would have been a cold New Year's Eve in Sweden if that reactor hadn't been tested," said Mariotte. "Testing and ensuring Y2K compliance is the critical issue here, and too many utilities have left them-selves too little time for proper testing, and fixing the new unexpected bugs testing reveals."

NIRS also announced that it is contacting funders in an effort to launch a Y2K awareness campaign through its existing Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States program. "On one hand, the relatively poor reactor designs in those countries have a silver lining: they are much less dependent on digital technology," said Mariotte. "On the other hand, very little work is being put into identifying and repairing both their potential direct nuclear problems and problems associated with their electrical grid. A massive public awareness campaign and development of effective contingency/emergency plans are des-perately needed. One Chernobyl was too many."

"The Millennium should be a time of celebration and joy," concluded Mariotte, "not an occasion of fear or panic. The actions we are proposing today will go a long way toward providing assurance of our health and safety as we enter the excitement and promise of the 21st century.

Copies of the NIRS petitions and background materials are available from NIRS and on the NIRS web-site, www.nirs.org. --30--

-- Mark Robinowitz (mrobinowitz@igc.org), December 10, 1998

Answers

Good. Awareness grows.

Diane

-- Diane J. Squire (sacredspaces@yahoo.com), December 10, 1998.

re: "The Millennium should be a time of celebration and joy," concluded Mariotte, "not an occasion of fear or panic. The actions we are proposing today will go a long way toward providing assurance of our health and safety as we enter the excitement and promise of the 21st century."

1. Yes, it should be.

2. It will be exciting.

3. I sure am hearing a lot of promises.

-- Sara Nealy (saran@ptd.net), December 10, 1998.

Mark --

On the web site given, www.nirs.org, I could find nothing relating to this press release. The latest press release on the site, in re Yucca Mountain, is dated Nov. 18.

None of the other internal links referenced it either.

Where did you find it?

-- Tom Carey (tomcarey@mindspring.com), December 10, 1998.

Their comments on the Russian and Ukrainian reactors are correct.

But their solutions are 'required only for the US plants? Our plants will either be shutdown based on the July deadline date for demonstrated compliance, or will be running using approved, reviewed, and tested new software and systems.

What's the NIRS background? (Political and technical.) What's their agenda? Who funds them? How have they checked these redesign efforts? Who "designed" these changes? Who checked them?

Who (in the NRC or INPO organizations) is going to approve these major changes to emergency systems and operation procedures?

They (the NIRS) have stated a perceived problem, and are requiring major redesign efforts to solve that perceived problem. But their solution is not solving the problem, cannot be done by their deadline, and isn't applicable to US nuclear plants. (Example: A diesel gen. set this size is about the size and weight of a railroad diesel locomotive - requires its own building and control, and fuel installations, for example.) Regardless of expenses, it can't be designed, built, installed, tested, and integrated in time with the other nuclear safety systems in time to be used.

-- Robert A. Cook, P.E. (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 10, 1998.

interesting, I figured the antinuke lobby would wait until next spring-summer to try this sort of thing...wonder what made them suddenly decide to do it now? Striking while the iron is hot - i.e. the public is at least mildly aware of some future possible problems following the recent spate of y2k related press coverage? The recent election results? hmm...

I also wonder if they realize that, should they be unsuccessful NOW they are almost insuring that nothing will be done about the nukes next summer, when it will be much less politically acceptable to eliminate 20 percent of the production capacity of the grid. This could backfire bigtime...both figuratively for the antinuke types and possibly literally sometime after 01/01/00...

Arlin Adams

-- Arlin H. Adams (ahadams@ix.netcom.com), December 10, 1998.

Let's look at two other "indicators" of their concerns:

The fuel pools are similar to a swimming pool - about 24 to 48 feet deep, up to 100 feet across. They are normally in a separate building next the reactor building. Between 12 and 20 feet of "cover" water is over the highest part of the submerged fuel rods to provide extra shielding, this water is not required for cooling. To "boil off" even this cover water takes more energy than is present in the rods. It (boiling away) won't happen, that why there aren't backup cooling systems in the fuel pool. If water level got low (for any reason) it can be refilled rom any clean water source - including even somethng as simple as a fire truck hose.

Second - there are two (often three) redundant safety "trees" for power and control. These "trees" go independently back to either two or four separate emergency generators for each plant, each with an independent starting and fuel system. They are inspected and maintained as part of the design safety certification of the plant - and the plant is shutdown and severely penalized with fines and sanctions if/when problems are found. Routine maintenance and testing is done of these, most often during scheduled plant shutdowns. Depending on the plant's safety certification, the plant must be immediately shutdown if one or more of these backup diesels fails a test (or breaks) and cannot be used as a backup.

The NIRC group better be specifically ready to defend itself with details if they are arbitrarily claiming there are uncorrected problems with any of these machines. Bottom line is: it is because of these "ready use" backup systems, and the routine training all nuke operators have in their startup/shutdown/operations, that I believe the ukes will be more reliable than any fossil fuel plant. They will very likely be isolated points of light in a dark country side.

-- Robert A. Cook, P.E. (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 11, 1998.