In a article on the Westergaard site

http://www.y2ktimebomb.com/PP/RC/dm9840.htm

author Dick Mills takes the "don't raise the bridge, lower the river" approach by asserting that the power grid can be operated without the use of SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) and EMS (Energy Management Systems). Thus, he claims, even if the telecommunications lines go down and the SCADA/EMS systems fail due to embedded chip problems (or whatever), the grid can continue to operate.

He draws a distinction between "safe, reliable, affordable" power, any power at all, and no power. Given the seriousness of a prolonged power loss, my questions are:

1. Can the entire grid indeed be operated without SCADA/EMS systems?

2. What would be the implications (liability, damage to sensitive equipment, etc)

3. Is this a viable contingency?

Sure, I want safe systems, but I might choose a 'hob-cobbled' system over none at all. Mills changes the definition of 'mission critical' in a way that, although it might cause problems itself, might also save many lives.

I realize that this is only one of many issues involved in keeping the lights on but if what he says is true, then it may deserve serious consideration.

Comments?

Arnie

-- Arnie Rimmer (arnie_rimmer@usa.net), October 12, 1998

Answers

Arnie,

I read the same piece as you from Dick Mills. Of anyone in the power game who has written pieces, he has been the most even in calling a bad spot a bad spot and a good spot and a good spot. If he is scared about something, he tell syou, if he's happy he tells you. No one else seems to be on as an even footing as he is.

With all that said, what he described sounded very workable to me. He mentione din the article that SCADA and EMS are brought down usually during Daylight Savings Time. While not a prolonged outage like what MAY (got to stress that) be caused by Y2K, I feel that is a pretty good sign.

I would suggest reading ALL (and trust me, it can get a lettle heady at times) of Dick Mills articles. He seems to have his screwed on pretty straight.

Rick

-- Rick Tansun (ricktansun@hotmail.com), October 12, 1998.

First, let me readily admit that the internals of EMS and SCADA are not my strength. But let me voice a few questions regarding Mill's statement. He states that the goal of utilities is to provide RSA (reliable, safe, affordable) power. Gee, that seems reasonable. He then goes on to say that if we wish to dispense with reliable and safe then we you don't need EMS or SCADA. Lets take the R part first. Without EMS/SCADA, the power company is generating a blind load. Remember, you can't store electricity on a grid. You generate to varying loads as necessary. Too little power and you get brownouts due to under voltage (very bad on lots of equipment). Too much and, well boom goes the substation(s)/transformers etc. Too toxic to roast marshmellows but I guess it would keep you warm on a cold January night. His example of how engineers would turn off SCADA/EMS for DST was at 2AM (and just for a short time) is not relevant. By the way, why couldn't the equipment handle a simple time change? Makes you wonder. Anyway, IF you have a very steady load, YES you could do without SCADA/EMS for awhile, but even then problems would develope with phase/frequency tuning between plants. (Power has to be harmonious, something like The Mamas and The Papas. When Marilyn Manson comes on all Hell breaks lose.) In a Y2K chaos state, plants/buildings/subdivisions may well be bouncing on and off the grid as individual power controls reset over and over. Thus a VERY unsteady load is likely and thus SCADA/EMS is critical. Without them, you will likely blowup critical parts of your infrastructure like switching points/substations.(That is the S part.) Strictly my amateurs view but I think Mills is grasping at straws. SCADA/EMS are there because the power companys need them there in order to generate AND distibute RSA. Non-RSA power would be short lived.

-- R. D..Herring (drherr@erols.com), October 12, 1998.

Can we operate the entire grid without SCADA/EMS? Probably not. Let me explain some levels of failure here. In the '50s and earlier they operated the electric systems without computers. It was possible then, but there are few such systems available today for backup of the computers. Many control centers have data sources separate from SCADA for backup, some do not. Few operators have experience in using this data manually. Many SCADA systems are down occasionally and the world doesn't end because they don't all go down at once for long time periods. Many do go down at once during big wide-spread problems due to data overload but that is not more than 20 to 30% at most. If a large percent are down at once it will be a big problem, the system will be operating itself. It can do that during calm times but not during a big upheaval.

What would be the implications to equipment? The system equipment should protect itself automatically if the relays don't malfunction. Many relays are still coils and solenoids, no chips. Your voltage sensitive equipment should already be protected by good quality surge suppressors.

I supposed I have to agree with Dick Mills, that blackouts will be likely if generators, loads, lines start to trip in number and SCADA is widely unavailable to monitor and remote control the system. Most of the powerplants are already manned around the clock and substations can still be manned and both operated manually if phone communication is available. It will be slower than normal but the system or parts of it will be reenergized.

-- Operator (awake@theswitch.com), October 12, 1998.

I don't pretend to understand the technical issues involved ("SCADA" has only recently been burned into my brain, and I still struggle with understanding it). So I rely on Dick Mills and other "experts" in the field.

I'm not trying to oversimplify the issue. I understand it is a complex one. I do have a question, however. Am I to understand that our options boil down to no power or "dirty" power? That seems to be the conclusion.

-- Steve Hartsman (hartsman@ticon.net), October 13, 1998.

No, you're allowed to have both "dirty power" and "no power," just not at the same time in the same place.

Under Mills plan some places will be able to stay on line and provide dirty power, but others will still go down and not provide power.

Of course, the choice isn't up to you.....you take what you get :)

-- rocky (rknolls@hotmail.com), October 13, 1998.

Like most of here in the peanut gallery, electric power is not my game -- like everyone else, all I can do is read (the varying) opinions by "experts", and then try to apply my "Hope for the best, prepare for the worst" angle. Dick Mills is widely recognized as a Y2K optimist's optimist, and although he had some very sobering non-optimist comments regarding the NERC report, he still snaps back with flippant statements like "yeah, the power may go completely out -- but for no more than 72 hours", or something like that. I guess the main thing that I have noted lacking in his assessments (maybe you have to understand all those silly graphs??? ... just kidding) is a lack of treatment of the INTERDEPENDENCIES of trying to do electric power without SCADA/EMS. Other "experts" like Rick Cowles tend to look at the big picture; Dick Mills writes fondly of the old days when they burned furniture to re-start a plant back in the Big One of 1965. Don't get me wrong, I agree that the guy sure comes across as being very honest, but he sure seems to come to some very specific (and very optimistic) conclusions about an event that will be unlike we have ever seen before (which all the graphs and furniture may not be able to save us from...).

-- Jack (jsprat@eld.net), October 13, 1998.

I would very much like to believe in Dick Mills scenario wherein the grid is semi-functional. But with so many individual power utilities it seems the probabilities are not in our collective favor.

It takes only one real world horror story about a nuclear power plant to snap me back to skeptism about the grid's stability under stress. Follow the link below to read about one plant's encounter with a tornado. I found the part about "offsite electricity available to power cooling pumps" especially ominous.

http://enquirer.com:80/editions/1998/07/19/loc_nuke19.html

-- Jay (djroth@fuse.net), October 14, 1998.